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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in

conflict with federal law on a question which should be settled
by the Supreme Court insofar as the appellate court granted
plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
S 1988 even though:
(a)

Plaintiff's constitutional claim was denied

by the trial court, thus preventing plaintiff from
being recognized as a "prevailing party" for purposes
of 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988; and
(b)

The substantive state law claim on which

plaintiff prevailed did not arise from the same operative facts as plaintiff's constitutional claim.
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly decided an

important question of state law which has not previously been
addressed by this Court when it ruled that a school district cannot grant partial fee waivers to families who are ineligible for
a full waiver.
DECISIONS IN THIS CASE
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals dated December 20,
1989, and reversing the trial court was reported at 124 Utah Adv.
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Rep. 37 (Ct. App. 1989).

Different results were reached on

rehearing as reported at 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Opinion and Amended Opinion of the Court
of Appeals are reproduced in Addendum "A."
JURISDICTION
A.

The Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals was

entered March 6, 1990.
B.

The Amended Opinion was rendered upon Lorenc's

Petition for Rehearing.

There has been no subsequent Petition

for Rehearing.
C.

This Court has jurisdiction to grant review by writ

of certiorari on all of the questions presented for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(5).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS
FEE WAIVERS,
Utah Code Ann. provides in relevant part:
A local board of education shall require . . . that
adequate waivers or other provisions are available to
insure that no student is denied the opportunity to
participate because of an inability to pay the required
feef deposit or charge.
Utah Code Ann. S 53-7(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).

-3-

The State Board of Education fee waiver policy similarly
provides:
A board of education shall provide, as part of any fee
policy or schedule, for adequate waivers or other provisions to insure that no student is denied the opportunity to participate in a class or school sponsored or
supported activity because of an inability to pay the
fee.
The waiver policy shall include procedures to
insure that:

(d) Fee waivers or other provisions in lieu of fee
waivers are available to all students who are in state
custody or receiving public assistance in the form of
aid to dependent children, general relief, supplemental
security income, or foster care, and others whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay.
Admin. Code R. 300-407-6(A)(4) (1987-88).-7
Granite School District Administrative Memorandum No.
2/
24, July 29, 1986- established the following Granite fee waiver
policy in effect during the 1986 to 1987 school year:
Fees, as identified by the Granite School District
Board of Education, will be waived in accord with Utah
State Board of Education standards for students whose
parents or legal guardians are the recipient of public
assistance in the form of Aid to Dependent Children,
i/

This provision was adopted by the State Board of Education
June 3, 1986 and was in effect during the period relevant to
this action.

2/

Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative Memorandum No. 24 was amended September 19, 1989, to make fee
waivers available for all students financially unable to
pay.
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General Relief, Supplemental Security Income, Foster
Care, or other benefits provided through the Department
of Social Services due to a limited financial ability
within the family. (The receipt of unemployment compensation and/or free or reduced price school lunches
does not constitute public assistance as above
defined).
A student desiring fee waivers will present to the
principal of the school a written communication provided by the Utah Department of Social Services or the
Social Security Office in the case of "Supplemental
Security Income" verifying the need for the waiver.
Upon receipt of such verification, the principal will
waive requested fees for the student. In the event
that the student bringing forward the verification
desires an accommodation other than fee waiver, the
principal, with the permission of the parent or legal
guardian, may provide an alternative to the payment of
the fee or the waiver. Such may include a deferred
payment schedule, a reduced payment schedule, or a provision for a work/service program . . .
Parents whose students have been denied a fee waiver
may appeal to the Granite School District. Office of
Pupil Services for review. In the event that Pupil
Services feels a waiver is warranted, the principal and
a Pupil Services designee will meet with the Area
Assistant Superintendent who will make a determination
in the matter.
That same memorandum also provides in a summary provision:
Students must be able to enroll and participate in any
class, and have the opportunity to acquire all skills
and knowledge required for full credit and highest
grades, without paying a fee.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

-5-

Utah Const, art. I, S 7:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend XIV, S 1.
FEE PROVISIONS OF UNITED STATES CODE.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. . . .
42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (1981).

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the
Revised Statutes [20 U.S.C.S SS 1981-1983, 1985, 1986],
title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.S SS 1681 et
seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C.A. S 1988 (1981).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.
Gwen Lorenc ("Lorenc"), plaintiff and appellant, initiated this action against the Granite School District ("Granite")
February 11, 1987. (R. 8). She claimed that Granite's school
fee waiver policy (the "Granite Policy") violated Utah statute
because it was more restrictive than the Utah State Board of Education School Fees Policy ("State Policy").

(R. 5-6). The basis

for her contention was that the State Policy included a provision
that "waivers or other provisions in lieu of fee waivers are
available . . . [to students whose families receive public assistance] and others whose parents or guardians are financially
unable to pay." (Emphasis added).

(R. 2). The wording of the

Granite Policy, although otherwise similar to the State Policy,
did not specifically include the language "parents or guardians
who are financially unable to pay." (R. 3).
In addition to Lorenc's claim that the Granite Policy
was invalid on its face, she claimed that Granite's application
of its waiver policy violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States constitution.

(R. 5-6). Those

contentions were based on her allegations that she had been
denied both an appeal hearing and a fee waiver even though allegedly eligible for a waiver under the State Policy. (R. 5-6).
-7-

Lorenc prayed for a declaration that Granite's fee
waiver policy was invalid and an order requiring Granite to conduct an appeal hearing and waive all school fees charged to her.
(R. 8)

She also moved for preliminary and permanent injunctions

enjoining Granite's continued use of its fee waiver policy until
adoption of a new policy in compliance with the State Policy and
Utah statute.

(R. 8 ) .

PROCEEDINGS BELOW,
Lorenc's motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions was heard and denied.

(R. 75). After trial before the

district court, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
adopted and Lorenc's complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

(R.

96-104).
On appeal, the court ruled: (a) That the Granite Policy
was invalid because it was more restrictive on its face than the
State Policy; (b) That granting partial fee waivers was contrary
to the State Policy; and (c) That Lorenc's attorney's fees claim
based on 42 U.S.C. S 1988 was denied.

Lorenc v. Call, 124 Utah

Adv. Rep. 37, 5-7 (Ct. App. 1989), different results reached on
rehearing, Lorenc v. Call, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App.
3/
1990).The appellate court did not address Lorenc's due

See Addendum A.
-8-

process claim or any of the facts supporting that claim.
124 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.

Lorenc,

Neither did the appellate court address

whether she would have been eligible for a full waiver under the
State Policy.
On Lorenc's Petition for Rehearing, the Court of
Appeals restated its previous ruling on the merits of the case,
but reversed its prior denial of attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. S 1988 in a split decision on that issue.

Lorenc, 129

Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, 7, 10.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON REVIEW,
1.

Lorenc applied for a fee waiver for her daughter, a

senior at Granite High School and the oldest of six children, on
September 5, 1986.
2.

(R. 29).

Lorenc's application for a full waiver was denied.

(R. 209 at 17, 79, 122). On September 22, 1986, Lorenc requested
a hearing on her waiver application.
thereto).

(R. 209 at 18 and Exhibit 9

Her application was heard on November 5, 1986, at

which time she was allowed to present all desired information and
evidence of financial need.

(R. 209 at 121, 125). Lorenc was

then offered a partial waiver and opportunity to pay the remaining fees through a work credit.

(R. 209 at 121-22).
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3.

Lorenc's appeal of Granite's November 5, 1986 deci-

sion was heard March 9, 1987, and denied.

(R. 209 at 126,

128-129).
4.

Lorenc's counsel cancelled two appeal hearings

which Granite had scheduled prior to March 9, 1987.

(R. 209 at

126).
5.

Lorenc was represented by counsel at the March 19,

1987 hearing and was given an opportunity to present evidence,
cross-examine school district witnesses, and call her own witnesses.

A written decision was rendered.
6.

(R. 209 at 127-129).

This action was filed by complaint dated February

11, 1987 claiming both that Granite Policy was invalid under
State law and also that her constitutional rights had been violated.

(R. 4, 5).
7.

The case was tried before the Honorable Homer

Wilkinson beginning May 18, 1987. Lorenc's complaint was dismissed. (R. 103-104).
8.

The trial court adopted Findings of Fact and Con-

clusions of Law July 2, 1987.
9.

(R. 96-104).

The trial court reached Lorenc's state law and con-

stitutional claims and decided both claims against Lorenc.
96-104).
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(R.

10.

The appellate court ruled that the Granite Policy

was facially invalid and did not reach Lorenc's constitutional
claims.

Lorenc, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.
11.

The appellate court awarded fees to Lorenc pursu-

ant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988.

Lorenc, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at

10.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD SETTLE WHEN ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE GRANTED
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. S 1988.
There are numerous federal cases concerning when a pre-

vailing party is entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988 even though the trial court has not reached the
merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claim.

Although an

extremely important issue for both plaintiffs and defendants,
that issue has never been addressed by this Court.

Furthermore,

the Amended Opinion in this case rendered by the court of appeals
conflicts with federal case law concerning this issue.

Accord-

ingly, this Court should grant Granite's petition for certiorari.
Lorenc correctly argues that a prevailing party may be^
entitled to an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
even when the Court does not reach the constitutional issues giving rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983.

-11-

Smith v. Robinson,

468 U.S. 992, 1006-1007, 82 L. Ed. 2d 746, 104 S. Ct. 3457
(1984).

That entitlement does not arise, however, unless:
(a)

Plaintiff is the "prevailing party"; and

(b)

The state claim on which the plaintiff

pre-

vails arises from a common nucleus of operative fact
with the constitutional claim.
Ld.;

Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, 1093 (4th Cir.

1981).

Lorenc's claim for attorney's fees fails because neither

of these prerequisite are met.

The relationship between those

prerequisites and the facts of this case, however, was not
addressed by the Court of Appeals.
A.

Lorenc is Not a Prevailing Party Under 42 U.S.C. S 1983
Because the Trial Court Denied Her Constitutional
Claim,
Lorenc is not the "prevailing party" for purposes of 42

U.S.C. S 1988.

Lorenc's Petition for Rehearing and the court

below rely on the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding a
decision on constitutional issues if the case can be decided on
statutory grounds as justification for granting attorney's fees
to Lorenc pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988.

See Maher v. Gagne, 448

U.S. 122, 133 n.15, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653, 100 S.Ct. 2570 (1980).
The rationale for authorizing a fee award for an unaddressed constitutional claim is to avoid penalizing a litigant for the

-12-

court's reluctance to consider a constitutional claim when there
is a dispositive state claim.

E.g., Smith, 468 U.S. at 1107.

The rationale explained in Smith is only applicable,
however, when the trial court does not reach the constitutional
claim, since the effect of this practice is to allow the trial
court to assume that the plaintiff has prevailed on his
"fee-generating" constitutional claim.

Jki. That rationale does

not apply in this case because the trial court denied Lorenc's
4/
constitutional claim.The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law provide:
The Granite School District hearing procedure meets the
legal requirements of notice; presentation of evidence,
representation by legal counsel and a final written
decision.

i/

The constitutional violations alleged by Lorenc were plead
as follows:
18. Plaintiff has been denied her right to due
process of law and equal protection of law, as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the United States
Constitution in that:
(a) she has been denied the opportunity to
have an appeal hearing to contest the denial of
her request for fee waivers; and
(b) she has been denied such fee waivers
even though elegible for the waivers under state
law and rules of the Utah State Board of
Education.
-13-

The fee waiver policy as implemented by Granite School
District meets the requirements of the law and of the
statutory authority for determination of a student's
inability to pay the fees appropriately assessed,
• • •

The Granite School District did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in determining plaintiff's ability to pay
a portion of the student fees assessed,
(R. 101 at HH 7, 3, 8 ) . Hence, Lorenc cannot rely on the fact
that she prevailed on the state claim as support for her fee
claim.
Federal courts have declined an attorney's fees award
in similar cases,

Luria Bros, & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357

(3rd Cir. 1982); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir.
1980); Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1984).
The facts in Luria are similar to the ones in this case.

Luria

lost on his S 1983 claim but prevailed on his state claim.

He

then asserted entitlement to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
SS 1983, 1988 because he had prevailed under state law.

The

Third Circuit Court held, however, that Luria was not the prevailing party for purposes of Section 1983 because he had failed
on his constitutional claim.

Luria, 672 F.2d at 357.

Accord

Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1980) (attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 are not justified where plaintiff has
lost on a constitutional issue after trial).

-14-

In all of the cases cited by Lorenc or the court in
support of the fee award in this case, the constitutional claim
was either not reached by the trial court or reached and decided
in plaintiff's favor.

This is a different case which does not

permit the same result.

Although the appellate court did not

reach Lorenc's constitutional claim, the claim was considered and
denied by the trial court.

Lorenc is not entitled to prevailing

party status under § 1983 and is, therefore, not entitled to an
attorney's fee award.
B.

The State Claim on Which Lorenc Prevailed Did Not Arise
from the Same Operative Facts as Lorenc's Constitutional Claim,
An award of attorney's fees to Lorenc is also improper

because a prevailing party cannot rely on a substantial,
unaddressed constitutional claim as the basis for an award of
attorney's fees unless both the constitutional claim and the
state claim on which plaintiff prevails arise from a common
nucleus of operative facts.
(1976).

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n.7

Fees are not awarded when the claim on which plaintiff

prevails is based on distinctly different facts and legal theories than the unaddressed constitutional claim.

Texas Teachers

Assoc, v. Garland Independent School Dist.y 489 U.S.

, 103 L.

Ed. 2d 866, 875, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (1989); Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. at 1006.

See also Lofft v. State Board of Higher Education,
-15-

89 Or. App. 614, 750 P.2d 515 (1988) (attorney's fees were
awarded under Section 1988 to a plaintiff whose constitutional
claim was not reached

because plaintiff relied on the same

actions of defendant to make out both the constitutional claim
and the state claim on which plaintiff prevailed).
In this casef the operative facts supporting the claim
decided by the appellate court do not also support Lorenc's constitutional claim.

The Court of Appeals invalidated the Granite

Policy solely on the basis that the language was more restrictive
than the language of the State Policy.
Rep. at 6.

See Lorencr 129 Utah Adv.

The decision did not address application of the Gran5/
.
.
.

ite Policy,—

the appeal procedure which Lorenc claimed was vio-

lative of due process and equal protection or whether Lorenc
would have been eligible for a waiver under the State Policy.
There is only one fact underlying the appellate courtfs
decision —

that the State Policy includes language including

students whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay
while the Granite Policy does not.
State Policy.

Compare Granite Policy with

From this single fact, the court concluded

Granite still contends that its application of the Granite
Policy had the same effect as the more general wording of
the State Policy.
-16-

that the Granite Policy conflicts with state law.
The operative facts concerning Lorenc's constitutional
claim are quite different because they include all of the facts
related implementation of the Granite Policy,

They include all

of the facts concerning Lorenc's waiver application, Granite's
general procedures concerning waiver applications, Granite's
response to Lorenc's individual situation, the notices Lorenc
received, the details concerning scheduling for Lorenc's appeal
hearing, Lorenc's financial situation, the evidence Lorenc was
allowed to present at each hearing with Granite officials, and
the dates of all relevant actions by both parties.The operative facts for the claim on which Lorenc prevailed are not the same as the constitutional claim she alleges

£/

Consideration of these facts would have demonstrated that a
four month hiatus between Lorenc's first and second hearings
was not a denial of due process, and that any delay in
scheduling Lorenc's appeal hearing was not caused by Granite
but by Lorenc's attorney's cancellation of two previously
scheduled dates. Consideration of the facts would further
show that Lorenc's children were not denied any privileges
during this four month period, and that the partial fee
waiver and the work credit option offered to Lorenc would
have allowed her children to participate without paying any
fee whatsoever. The Granite Policy as applied to Lorenc was
consistent with the State Policy, and there was no denial of
a property right or right to be heard.
-17-

under 42 U.S.C. S 1983.

As a result, she is not entitled to an

award of attorney's fees.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE STATE POLICY ALLOWS
PARTIAL FEE WAIVERS.
The second issue before this Court is whether the Court

of Appeals correctly decided that the language of the State Policy does not permit a partial fee waiver.

This is an important

issue in education which should also be addressed by this Court.
The Board's rules define waiver as "Release from the
requirement of payment of a fee and from any provision in lieu of
fee payment."

Utah Admin. Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88).

The

Court of Appeals ruled that such definition did not allow for a
reduction of fee payments or allow a partial waiver.
That conclusion is inconsistent with the policy underlying fee waivers.

Waivers are provided because students should

be allowed to participate in school activities regardless of the
financial ability of the family.

The State Policy, in fact,

provides:
A board of education shall provide, as part of any fee
policy or schedule for, adequate waivers or other provisions to ensure that no student is denied the opportunity to participate in a class or school-sponsored or
supported activity because of an inability to pay a
fee.
That provision is mirrored in Granite's fee policy which
requires:
-18-

The local board of education shall provide, as part of
any fee policy or schedule, for adequate waivers or
other revisions to insure that no student is denied the
opportunity to participate in a class or
school-sponsored or supported activity because of a
demonstrated inability to pay a fee.
The practice of granting partial fee waivers in situations where a family does not qualify for a full waiver is consistent with these policies.

Financial relief by way of a waiver

is available not only to families who are unable to pay any fee
at all but are also available to those who are unable to pay only
a portion of the fee.

In all cases where a family is not eligi-

ble for a full waiver but still financially needy, the partial
waiver policy implements the State Policy by reducing the fee to
an amount the family is financially able to pay.
Partial waivers should be encouraged instead of invalidated.

If a school district is not allowed to provide a partial

waiver, its only alternative for a student who does not qualify
for a full waiver is to deny the waiver application.

It is

incongruous for the Court to sanction that result by invalidating
partial waivers and thereby harm the category of people which fee
waiver policies are designed to protect.

-19-

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has rendered a decision concerning
application of 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988 which is inconsistent with
federal case law.

This is an important issue which should be

addressed and clarified by this Court.
The Court of Appeals also held that the language of the
State Policy does not permit partial fee waivers.

This, too, is

a significant issue which has not yet been addressed by this
Court.

Granite's Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be granted

to resolve these timely and important issues.
DATED this

rY

day of April 1990.
-fid
M. Byron fisher
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this _4? -^ day of April 1990,
I caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Defendants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Bruce Plenk, Esq.
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GWEN LORENC,
Plaintiff,

:

v,

:

JOHN REED CALL, in his
official capacity as
Superintendent of Schools
of the Granite School District,
and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

:

JUDGMENT

Civil No. C-87-01032
Judge Homer Wilkinson

:
:

Defendants.
Trial of this matter having been completed before this
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge presiding, on May
18, 1987, and closing arguments having been completed May 19,
1987 and legal counsel for plaintiff, Bruce A. Plenk, and legal
counsel for defendants, M. Byron Fisher, having presented memoranda, submitted the matter for decision.

The Court being fully

advised and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now enters the following:

JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby awarded to defendant, no cause of
action, plaintiff's Complaint is disr ssed with pr

udice, eecn

party to bear their own costs herein
<^ day offfiugfc', 1987.

DATED this

istrict Judge
APPROVAL AS/^O FORM:

/jv.".'.

ATT^ST^
DIXCN Hi^OLEY

Brufce A. P l e n k

?, B* •

«^

•

D«putyCterk

Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to
Bruce A. Plenk, Attorney for Plaintiff, Utah Legal Services,
Inc., 124 South Fourth East, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this Q
day of June, 1987.

MBF:060887B
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GWEN LORENC,
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

JOHN REED CALL, in his
official capacity as
Superintendent of Schools
of the Granite School District,
and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. C-87-01032
Judge Homer Wilkinson

:
:

Defendants.
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Homer
Wilkiinson on May 18, 1987.
Plenk represented plaintiff.
dants.

The parties were present.

Bruce A.

M. Byron Fisher represented defen-

The Court received evidence and testimony, the matter was

argued to the Court on May 19, 1987 and submitted for decision.
The Court being fully advised, and the parties having filed Memoranda to the Court, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County and of

the Granite School District.

a(inr^G

2.

Plaintiff is a single parent having been divorced.

Plaintiff was awarded custody of her six minor children.

Perti-

nent to these proceedings, Catherine is 17 years of age and a
senior at Granger High School, Michael Lorenc is 15 years of age
and in the 9th grade at West Lake Junior High School, and Brandi
is 13 years of age and in the 7th grade at West Lake Junior High
School.
3.

During the 1986-87 school year, Koarns High School

assessed fees for students of book rental $25 ($10 refundable),
after-school activity fee $15 (optional), yearbook $20 (optional)
and for Catherine to take a personal finance class $6 for a consumable workbook, $32 graduation car and gown rental (optional).
4.

During the 1986-87 s

jol year, West Lake Junior

High School assessed its students book rental $25 ($10 refundable), after-school activity fee $5 (optional), memory book and
for Michael $13 woodwork shop expenses for class project
materials.
5.

In 1986, the State legislature enacted legislation

as to a state policy regarding student fees, deposits or other
charges, (53-7a-l, U.C., 86-87) and a fee waiver provision
(53-7a-2, U.C., 86-87).
6.

In response to the legislative mandate, in July,

1986, the State School Board of Education adopted Rules and Regulations to implement a fee, deposit and charges policy and a fee
waiver policy.

-2-
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7.

In July, 1986, Granite School District adopted

rules and regulations for a school district fee schedule and fee
waiver policy by adopting the State regulations and implementing
the school district policy.
8.

In the fee waiver section of the legislation

(53-7a-2, U.C., 86-87), the legislature did not define the criteria necessary to determine a fee waiver as to when a student
would be allowed to "participate because of an inability to pay
the required fee."
9.

The State Board of Education failed to provide any

criteria in its Rules and Regulations as to the determination of
"inability to pay" except as to those students who were

partici-

pants in State aid programs.
10.

The State Board of Education failed to provide any

regulations as to partial fee waivers.
11.

Granite School District Board of Education prop-

erly assumed the responsibility to establish its own regulations
to determine a reasonable basis for fee waivers and to determine
whether a student was unable to pay the fees as assessed.
12.

Granite School District fee policy conforms to the

statutory requirements and the State Regulations in that
a.

Book rental fees are appropriate fees to be

assessed.
be

After school activity fees may be charged as long

as these charges are optional to the student.

-3-

c.

Fees for classes may be charged for consumable

materials or materials to be taken by the student from the
school sue;, ^.s class wor

ooks

id materials used in a stu-

dent pro;, .t such as wood shop or art class,
d.

Fees for yearbooks and memory books are appropriate

charges since these items are optional to the student.
e.

Fees for caps and gowns are not school charges and

should not be handled as a school charge.
13.

The Granite School District fee waiver policy con-

forms to the statutory requirements.
14.
assistance

Plaintiff was not a recipient of state or public

t thp time these charges were assessed.
i5.

Plaint .

made application for consideration of a

fee waiver for her children.
16.

At the time of this action, plaintiff was employed

making approximately $1,300 per month income.
17.

Plaintiff has not sought to enforce the child sup-

port payments from the children1s father which were awarded in
Decree of Divorce but did request assistance to pay night class
fees.
18.

Catherine has taken night school classes and has

paid $125 tuition for those classes, $50 of which came from the
child's natural father when plaintiff requested his assistance.
19.

Plaintiff requested a fee waiver for Catherine at

th- time of registration in the fall of -.986 to Granger High
School.
-4-
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20.

The request for fee waiver pursuant to the School

District fee waiver policy was heard by the Superintendent's
designee in November, 1986, and at plaintiff's request was
reheard in February, 1987.
21.

The hearing officer recommended a partial fee

waiver for plaintiff's children based upon plaintiff's income and
the fact that plaintiff did not qualify for and had not obtained
assistance from State or Federal aid programs or from private aid
programs.
22.

The School District fee waiver policy as imple-

mented meets with the statutory requirement of determining a
student's inability to pay the assessed appropriate fees.
23.

Partial fee waivers are appropriate in this situa-

tion based upon the School District regulations which were implemented for matters which the State School Board failed to regulate and for which guidelines were not provided.
24.

Notice of the School District fee waiver policy to

plaintiff was adequate and met the State guidelines.
25.

Fee waiver policies should apply to fees charged

for school sponsored activities such as after school activity
fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the claims herein

and the parties hereto.
2.

The charging of fees to students as outlined herein

were appropriate fees and are not an abrogation of the
-5-

constitutional right to a free education as provided in the Constitution of the State of Utah.
3.

The fee policy as implemented by the Granite School

District met the requirements of the law and the regulatory
requirements of the State Board of Education.
4.

Tre fee waiver policy as implemented by Granite

School District meets the requirements of the law and of the
statutory authority for determination of a student's inability to
pay the fees appropriately assessed.
5.

The State Board of Education Rules and Regulations

are deficient in providing the school district with guidelines in
the fee waiver regulations to 1) give notice to students of
waiver policies, 2) determine a student's inability to pay, 3)
establishing a hearing procedure to review requests for fee
waiver, 4) in providing for partial fee waivers.
6.

The Granite School District acted properly and

within the statutory authorization to establish regulations and
procedures to meet the requirements of the law which the State
Board of Education failed to establish.
7.

The Granite School District hearing procedure meets

the legal requirements of notice, presentation of evidence, representation by legal counsel and a final written decision.
8.

The Granite School District did not act arbitrarily

or capriciously in determining plaintiff's ability to pay a portion of the student fees assessed.

-6-
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9.

Plaintiff should pay the fees as assessed under the

partial fee waiv-10.

:• *^-\,,'

by the hearing officer.

Fee waivers should not apply to optional charges

and charges for consumable materials such as consumable wnrk
books and wood shop projects which are taken by the student.
11.

Judgment should be entered for defendants, no

cause of action, each party should assume their own costs

DATED this J^

day of J^ft^l987

District Judge

ATTES^

70V FORM:

H. DIXON Hs.w^Y

±1
A. Plenk

^

&
CteputyCtark

Bruc£
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to Bruce A. Plenk, Attorney for
Plaintiff, Utah Legal Services, Inc., 124 South Fourth East, 4th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this >fc£ day of June, 1987.

"y/LuMyjCi*^
MBF-.060887A
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo--—
Gwen Lorenc,
Plaint •

John Reed Call, in his official
capacity as Superintendent of
Schools of the Granite School
District; and the Board of
of Education of Granite School
District,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Caae No. 890286-CA

Defendants and Respondents.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys

Hoormn

f t * Court
M * t C « M t « Appeals

Bruce M. Plenk, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
ML Byron Fisher, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals an adverse judgment entered on her
complaint alleging that defendants* former fee waiver policy
violated state law and board of education rules. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
At the inception of the 1986-87 school year, plaintiff Gwen
Lorenc was a single parent of six minor children, three of whom
attended secondary schools in the Granite School District
(District). Prior to the commencement of classes, the District
advised plaintiff and other parents that fees would be imposed
on students for various activities, books, and materials. The

District subsequently assessed plaintiff a total of almost $200
in fees for her three secondary school students. On September
5, 1986, plaintiff contacted the high school principal and
applied for a waiver of fees on the basis of financial
hardship. She was denied a waiver, and was referred to the
District's fee waiver administrator. The administrator
subsequently met with plaintiff and determined that she was
eligible for a "partial waiver.H Plaintiff appealed this
decision to the District, requesting a hearing. No hearing was
scheduled# however, until after plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in
Third District Court.
On March 9, 1987, the District conducted a formal hearing
in which plaintiff was represented by counsel and was permitted
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. After the
hearing, plaintiff's application for a full waiver was again
denied by the District.
Plaintiff's lawsuit proceeded to trial before Judge Homer
F. Wilkinson on May 18-19, 1987. After hearing the evidence,
Judge Wilkinson determined that the District's fee policy
conformed to state law and the rules promulgated by the Utah
State Board of Education (Board). In awarding judgment to
defendants. Judge Wilkinson concluded that the Board's rules
did not address certain aspects of fee waivers, and that
because the District policy properly addressed those issues, it
was valid.
VALIDITY OF DISTRICT POLICY
Plaintiff claims that the District's fee waiver policy is
more restrictive than the policy established by the Board's
rules, and is thus invalid. The Board's rules provide, in
pertinent part:
A board of education shall provide, as
part of any fee policy or schedule, for
adequate waivers or other provisions to
ensure that no student is denied the
opportunity to participate in a class or
school-sponsored or supported activity
because of an inability to pay a fee.
The waiver policy shall include
procedures to ensure that:

2

(4) fee waivers or other provisions in
lieu of fee waivers are available to alI
students who are in state custody or
receiving public assistance in the form ui
aid to dependent children, general relief,
supplemental security income, or foster
care, and others whose parents or guardians
are financial! y unable to pay,
Utah Admin, Code R

300-407-6(A) ( 4 "
» (1987-88).

The District's policy in effect liuiimj time iyBfe-a? school
year provided, in pertinent part:
Fees, as identified by the Granite
School District Board of Education, will be
waived in accord with Utah State Board of
Education standards for students whose
parents or legal guardians are the
recipients of public assistance in the form
of Aid to Dependent Children, General
Relief, Supplemental Security Income, Foster
Care, or other benefits provided through the
Department of Social Services due to a
limited financial ability within the
family. (The receipt of unemployment
compensation and/or free or reduced price
school lunches does not constitute public
assistance as above defined.)
A d n u n i s r r ** +

••-•

;

Plaintiff asserts that the District's fee waiver: policy
unduly restricted waivers to recipients of certain welfare
program benefits and lacked measures for preventing delay, for
reviewing waiver alternatives, and for processing appeals. In
comparison, the Board's rules do not limit fee waivers to
recipients of public assistance, but provide waivers to "others
whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay."

1. Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative
Memorandum No. 24 was amended September 18, 1989, to make fee
waivers available for all students financially unable to pay.

PlfnnHff co_n_cedes that the assessment of fees for
secondary school students is constitutional. See Utah Const.
art. X^. § 2. 2 Plaintiff__also_accepts as valid the statutory
provisions enacted in 1986 permitting local school districts to
authorize student fees under rules adopted by the Board, and
the statutory waiver policy for such. fees. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 53A-* 2-102," -103 (1989).3 Furthermore, plaintiff does not
2. At times pertinent to this dispute, Utah Const, art. X, § 2
provided:
The common schools shall be free. The
other departments of the system shall be
supported as provided by law.
"Common schools" has been interpreted to mean grades one
through eight. Logan Citv School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah
342, 349, 77 P.2d 348, 351 (1938). Article X, § 2 was amended,
effective July 1, 1987, to read:
Public elementary and secondary schools
shall be free, except the Legislature may
authorize the imposition of fees in the
secondary schools.
3- Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-102 (1989)—State policy on student
fees, deposits, or other charges.
(1) A fee, deposit, or other charge may not be made,
or any expenditure required of a student or the student's
parent or guardian, as a condition for student participation in
an activity, class, or program provided, sponsored, or
supported by or through a public school or school district,
unless aut1 rized by the local school board under rules adopted
by the Sta * Board of Education.
(2) A fee, deposit, charge, or expenditure may not be
required for elementary school activities which are part of the
regular school day or fcr materials used during the regular
school day.
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-l (Supp. 1987) (amendments
reflect minor changes in phraseology)).
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989)—Waiver of fees.
A local school board shall require, as part of an
authorization granted under Section 53A-12-102, that adequate
waivers or other provisions are available to ensure that no
student is denied the opportunity to participate because of an
inability to pay the required fee, deposit, or charge.
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-2 (Supp. 1987) (amendments
reflect minor changes in phraseology)).

challenge the rules promulgated by the Board to implement
sections 53A-1 2-102 and -101,
We begin, our analysis by reiterating the standard under
which we review a trial court's conclusions of law
we accord
them "no particular deference, but review them for
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242, 244
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) .
Rules may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." Crowther v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co,, 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (quoting IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 297
(Utah 1975)). A policy becomes a rule if "it conforms to the
definition of a rule.- Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(10)(b)
(1989), A policy thus more restrictive than the rule
promulgated under section 53A-12-103, abrogates the
legislature's objective in ensuring "that no student is denied
the opportunity to participate because of an inability to pay
the required fee[s]." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989),
When such administrative regulations and policies "conflict
with the design of an Act," we have a duty to invalidate them.
Crpwthgr, 762 P.2d at 1122 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552 P*2d 300, 30^ M Q 7 m \
In this case, the trial court concluded that "[t]he fee
waiver policy as implemented by Granite School District meets
the requirements of the law and of the statutory authority for
determination of a student's inability to pay the fees
appropriately assessed." However, the District's policy limits
the waiver of fees to those families receiving public
assistance. This is clearly more restrictive than the Board's
regulation waiving fees for students whose families do not
receive public assistance but are still unable to pay.
The District's practice in granting partial fee waivers is
also contrary to the Board's rules. Those rules define
"waiver" as, "Release from the requirement of payment of a fee
and from any provision in lieu of fee payment.- Utah Admin.
Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88). We believe this language is
capable of but one interpretation—a student is either eligible
for a fee waiver or not. No provision is made for the
reduction of fee payments or for the imposition of partial fees.
We conclude that the policy issued by the District on July
1986, was more restrictive than the Board"s rules on fee

waivers it was designed to implement. Since the resulting
policy conflicts with the statutory objective of ensuring
student participation by all those unable to pay, we invalidate
the District's po . ,cy.
In view of ou holding, we need not reach plaintiff's due
process claim* See Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah
1980) (constitutional questions are not to be addressed where
the merits can be determined on other grounds); see also State
v. Llovd A. Frv Roofing Co., 9 Or. App. 189, 495 P.2d 751, 754
(1972) (the presumption of constitutionality accorded to
legislation extends to rules proraui-ited by administrative
bodies exercising legislative powers).4
ATTORNEY FEES
In her appeal, plaintiff claims attorney fees under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1988 (1981). This ederal prov; sion permits an award of
attorney fees, in th trial court *s discretion, to the
prevailing party in any proceeding brought under section 1983
and other sections of that title. T*. Although such claims
are not limited to cases pursued in 3deral courts, a party
must plead a claim under the adera civil rights provisions in
order for there to be a basis for an award of attorney fees.
See Application of Fobison, 107 Idaho 1055, 695 P.2d 440, 442
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
Whether plaintiff's complaint states a claim for relief
under section 1983 is a question of law. Brule v. Southworth,
611 F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). "To state a claim for relief under
4. Plaintiff also alleges that the District promulgated an
unannounced fee waiver -policy- and takes issue with that
policy on due process and equal protection grounds. The record
is unclear whether the District had officially adopted such a
policy, although there is testimony from the fee administrator
that he had drafted a policy less restrictive than the
announced policy, but still more restrictive than that of the
Board. We merely note that any policy that conflicts wi^h the
rules remains invalid, and that all local school board -rules
and policies" must be -in writing, filed, and referenced for
public access.- Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14) (1989); see
also Athay v. Department of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965,
968 (Utah 1981) (failure to publish guidelines constituted
arbitrary action in violation of due process).

section 1983, a COmplainant need allege only (1) that some
person deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such person
acted under color of state law.- International Soc'v for
Krishna Consciousness. Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d
368, 373 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (citing Gomez v. Toledo. 446
U.S. 635 (1980)).
Plaintiff alleges in this case that the imposition of
student fees on those not receiving public assistance, but
still unable to pay, infringes on her children's right to a
free education. However, this is not a right, privilege or
immunity secured by the federal constitution. See Plvler v.
Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982) ("Public education is not a
•right1 granted to individuals by the Constitution.") (citing
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 34
(1973)), reh'o denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). Plaintiff has
thus failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983. In
the absence of an applicable statute or agreement, see Cobabe
v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) , plaintiff
is not entitled to her attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals an adverse judgment denying her claims
that defendants' former fee waiver policy and procedures
violated state law, board of education rules, and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. We reverse and remand.
We note that this opinion is issued in place of our prior
opinion in this case, Lorenc v. Call, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 37
(Ct. App. 1989), which was vacated on March 6, 1990. As a
result of a petition for rehearing in this case, we have
concluded that our previous opinion was in error on the issue
of plaintiff's right to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.CA.
§ 1988 (1981), and therefore grant the relief requested in
plaintiff's petition for rehearing.

FACTS
At the inception of the 19'-- 7 school y-ar, p intiff Gwen
Lorenc was a single parent of si^. minor chil ren, airee of waorn
attended secondary schools in the Granite School District
(District). Prior to the commencement of classes, the District
advised plaintiff and other parents that fees would be imposed
on students for various activities, books, and materials. The
District subsequently assessed plaintiff a total of almost $2'-0
in fees for her three secondary school students.
On September 5, 1986, plaintiff contacted the high school
principal to request a waiver of fees on the basis of financial
hardship. No written rules or regulations were distributed to
parents in order to guide plaintiff as to how she might qualify
for a fee waiver. She was denied a waiver, and was referred to
the District's fee waiver administrator to appeal the
decision. The administrator merely met with plaintiff and
determined that she was eligible for a "partial waiver" under
an unpublished policy providing for "partial waivers." This
appeal "hearing" was conducted with no formal notice and
without written procedures. Plaintiff appealed the partial
waiver of fees decision to the District, requesting a formal
hearing. No formal hearing was scheduled, however, until more
than six months la r, after plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment and preli inary and permanent injunctive relief in
Third District Court.
On March 9, 1987, the District conducted a formal hearing
in which plaintiff was represented by counsel and was permitted
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. After the
hearing, plaintiff's application for a full waiver was again
denied by the District.
Plaintiff's lawsuit proceeded to trial on May 18-19, x387.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that the
District's fee policy conformed to state law and the rules
promulgated by the Utah State Board of Education (Board) and
provided adequate notice and procedural protections to those
wishing to seek fee waivers.
VALIDITY OF DISTRICT POLICY
Plaintiff claims that the District's fee waiver policy is
more restrictive than the policy established by the Board'::
rules, and is thus invalid. The Board's rules provide, in
pertinent part:

A board of education shall provide, as
part of any fee policy or schedule, for
adequate waivers or other provisions to
ensure that no student is denied the
opportunity to participate in a class or
school-sponsored or supported activity
because of an inability to pay a fee.
The waiver policy shall include
procedures to ensure that:
(4) fee waivers or other provisions in
lieu of fee waivers are available to all
students who are in state custody or
receiving public assistance in the form of
aid to dependent children, general relief,
supplemental security income, or foster
care, and others whose parents or guardians
are financially unable to pay.
Utah Admin. Code R. 300-407-6(A)(4) (1987-88).
The District's policy in effect during the 1986-87 school
year provided, in pertinent part:
Fees, as identified by the Granite
School District Board of Education, will
be waived in accord with Utah State Board
of Education standards for students whose
parents or legal guardians are the
recipients of public assistance in the
form of Aid to Dependent Children, General
Relief, Supplemental Security Income,
Foster Care, or other benefits provided
through the Department of Social Services
due to a limited financial ability within
the family. (The receipt of unemployment
compensation and/or free or reduced price
school lunches does not constitute public
assistance as above definede)
Administrative Memorandum No. 24, July 29, 1986.1
1. Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative
Memorandum No. 24 was amended September 18, 1989, to make fee
waivers available for all students financially unable to pay.

Plaintiff asserts that the District's fee waiver policy
unduly restricted waiters to recipients of certain welfare
program benefits and lacked measures for preventing delay, for
reviewing wai/er alt -natives, and for processing appeals. In
comparison, the Boaru's rules do not limit fee waivers to
recipients of public assistance, but provide waivers to "others
whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay."
Plaintiff concedes that the assessment of fees for
secondary school students is constitutional. See Utah Const,
art. X, § 2. 2 Plaintiff also accepts as valid the statutory
provisions enacted in 1986 permitting local school districts to
authorize student fees under rules adopted by the Board, and
the statutory waiver policy for such fees. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 53A-12-102, -103 (1989).3 Furthermore, plaintiff does not
challenge the rules promulgated by the Board to implement
sections 53A-12-102 and -103.
2. At times pertinent to this dispute, Utah Const, art. X, § 2
provided:
The common schools shall be free. The
other departments of the system shall be
supported as provided by law.
"Common schc Is" has been in^arpreted to mean grades one
through eight. Logan City Schoo i Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah
342, 349, 77 P.2d 348, 351 (1938). Article X, § 2 was amended,
effective July 1, 1987, to read:
Public elementary and secondary schools
shall be free, except the Legislature may
authorize the imposition of fees in the
secondary schools.
3. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-102 (1989)—State policy on student
fees, deposits, or other c .rges.
(1) A fee, eposit, or other charge
may not be made, or any expenditure
required of a student or the student's
parent or guardian, as a condition for
student participation in an activity,
class, or program p ovided, sponsored, or
supported by or through a public school or
school district, unless authorized by the
local school board under rules adopted by
the State Board of Education.

We begin our analysis by reiterating the standard under
which we review a trial court's conclusions of law: we accord
them "no particular deference, but review them for
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242, 244
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Rules may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." Crowther v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (quoting IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 Pc2d 296, 297
(Utah 1975)). A policy becomes a rule if "it conforms to the
definition of a rule." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(10)(b)
(1989). A policy thus more restrictive than the rule
promulgated under section 53A-12-103, abrogates the
legislature's objective in ensuring "that no student is denied
the opportunity to participate because of an inability to pay
the required fee[s]." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989).
When such administrative regulations and policies "conflict
with the design of an Act," we have a duty to invalidate them.
Crowther, 762 P.2d at 1122 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552 P.2d 300, 303 (1976)).

(footnote 3 continued)
(2) A fee, deposit, charge, or expenditure
may not be required for elementary school
activities which are part of the regular
school day or for materials used during
the regular school day.
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-l (Supp. 1987) (amendments
reflect minor changes in phraseology)).
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989)--Waiver of fees.
A local school board shall require, as
part of an authorization granted under
Section 53A-12-102, that adequate waivers
or other provisions are available to
ensure that no student is denied the
opportunity to participate because of an
inability to pay the required fee,
deposit, or charge.
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-2 (Supp. 1987) (amendments
reflect minor changes in phraseology)).

In this case, the trial court concluded that "[t]he fee
waiver policy as implemented by Granite School District meets
t .e requirements of the law and of the statutory authority for
determination of a student's inability to pay the fees
appropriately assessed." However, the District's policy limits
the waiver of fees to those families receiving public
assistance. This is clearly more restrictive than the Board's
regulation waiving fees for students whose families do not
receive public assistance but are still unable to pay.
The District's practice in granting partial fee waivers is
also contrary to the Board's rules. Those rules define
"waiver" as, "[r]elease from the requirement of payment of a
fee and from any provision in lieu of fee payment." Utah
Admin. Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88). We believe this language
is capable of but one interpretation—a student is either
eligible for a fee waiver or not. No provision is made for the
reduction of fee payments or for the imposition of partial fees.
We conclude that the policy issued by the District on July
16, 1986, was more restrictive than the Board's rules on fee
waivers it was designed to implement. Since the resulting
policy conflicts with the statutory objective of ensuring
student participation by all those unable to pay, we invalidate
the District's policy.
In view of our holding, we need not reach plaintiff's due
process claim. See Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah
1980) (constitutional questions are not to be addressed where
the merits can be determined on other grounds).4
4. Plaintiff also alleges that the District promulgated an
unannounced fee waiver "policy" and takes issue with this
secret policy on due process and equal protection grounds. The
record is unclear whether the District had officially adopted
such a policy, although there is testimony from the fee
administrator that he had drafted a policy less restrictive
than the announced policy, bu*- still more restrictive than that
of the Board. We merely note chat any policy that conflicts
with the rules remains invalid, and that all local school board
"rules and policies" must be "in writing, filed, and referenced
for public access." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14) (1989); see
also Athav v. Department of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965
968 (Utah 1981) (failure to publish guidelines constituted
arbitrary action in violation of due process).

ATTORNEY FEES
In her appeal, plaintiff claims attorney fees under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1988 (1981). This federal provision permits an award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any proceeding brought
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and other sections of the civil rights
title. Id. Although such claims are not limited to cases
pursued in federal courts, a party must plead a federal civil
rights claim to qualify for an award of attorney fees. See
Application of Robison, 107 Idaho 1055, 695 P.2d 440, 442 (Ct.
App. 1985).
Whether plaintiffs complaint states a claim for relief
under section 1983 is a question of law. Brule v. Southworth,
611 F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). "To state a claim for relief under
section 1983, a complainant need allege only (1) that some
person deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such person
acted under color of state law." International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d
368, 373 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446
U.S. 635 (1980)).
Plaintiff, in the second cause of action of her complaint,
alleged that the District had denied her due process and equal
protection of the laws as provided for under the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution. She specifically complained that the
procedure utilized by the District for fee waivers denied her a
timely and fair initial hearing and appeal on her request for a
fee waiver. At the trial below and likewise on appeal,
plaintiff's constitutional claims were further developed.
Plaintiff argues that the fee waiver policy of the District not
only violated controlling Utah law and regulations, but also
that, as implemented, it violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff complains that the District's
unwritten waiver policy, the lack of any formal appeal
procedures, and the Board's long delay in finally dealing with
her claims violated her constitutional rights. We conclude
plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim for relief under
section 1983.
In our decision today, we invalidate the District's policy
because we find that it conflicts with state law. As a result,
we do not reach plaintiff's constitutional claims. However, it

does not automatically follow that plaintiff cannot recover her
attorney fee~ under section 1988.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held thit
a plaintiff is generally entitled to an award of attorney fees
under section 1988 if the plaintiff prevails on a statutory,
non-civil-rights claim which is pendent to a substantial
constitutional claim and vhich arises from a "common nucleus of
operative fact." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 (1984);
Maher v. Gaane, 448 U.S. 122, 133 n.15 (1980). See also S.
Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts § 23.2(a)
(1988) (footnotes omitted).5
In Maher, the plaintiff alleged that Connecticut's Aid to
Families with Dependent Children regulations violated the
Social Security Act and the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff prevailed in a
consent decree on her statutory claim. The Supreme Court
nevertheless upheld the district court's award of her counsel
fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). Maher, 448 U.S. at 133. The
Court approved the "award of fees in a case in which the
5.

The author states,
In authorizing fee awards to parties
who prevail on non-fee claims, Congress
wanted courts to award fees to prevailing
plaintiffs without being forced to reach
constitutional issues. Such avoidance of
unnecessary constitutional question is a
traditional principle that has long guided
federal courts in constitutional
litigation.
To permit courts to award aes
without reaching constitutional issues,
Congress borrowed the test it had
developed for the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. Under this test, courts may
award fees to parties who prevail on
nonconstitutional fee claim but only when
the fee a~1 non- ae claims c.ise out of a
common nu eus o_ operative fact.

S. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts
§ 23.2(a) (1988) .

plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil-rights
claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim." id. at
132. The Court explained that ,f[s]uch a fee award 'furthers
the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate
constitutional rights without undermining the longstanding
judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of important
constitutional issues.'" III. at 135 (quoting Gaane v. Maher,
594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979)).
Again in Smith, the Court considered the award of attorney
fees under section 1988 where the plaintiff had prevailed on a
pendent statutory claim. Although the Court denied attorney
fees, it did so on the narrow ground that Congress intended the
statute involved, the Education of the Handicapped Act, "to be
the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an
equal protection claim to a publicly financed special
education." 468 U.S. at 1009. The court concluded that since
the E.H.A. did not provide for attorney fees, Congress did not
intend fees be provided under section 1988 in the area of
litigation over special education. I&. at 1013. The Court's
conclusion was based on the expansive and pre-emptive nature of
the Act. Jji. at 1010-11.6 The Court, however, acknowledged
that a prevailing party should ordinarily be awarded attorney
fees under section 1988 and that "Congress did not intend to
have that authority extinguished by the fact that the case was
settled or resolved on a nonconstitutional ground." III. at 1006.
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently considered the precise
issue before us in Lofft v. State Bd. of Higher E d u c , 89 Or.
App. 614, 750 P.2d 515 (1988). In Lofft, the plaintiff brought
a state law tort and federal civil rights action claiming he
was wrongfully terminated from his employment. The trial court
awarded back pay under an employment contract theory, but
6. Congress reacted to the decision in Smith "swiftly,
decisively, and with uncharacteristic clarity to correct what
it viewed as a judicial misinterpretation of its intent."
Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ, 805
F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986). Congress amended the E.H.A.
to include the awarding of attorney fees and made the amendment
retroactive to the day before the Court announced its decision
in Smith. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986,
Pub.L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified in scattered
sections at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400) (1982 & Supp. 1988).

denied attorney fees apparently because the decision was based
on the state law claim. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed
on the attorney fees issue* The court determined that the
plaintiff was .he prevailing party on his state law claim, id.
at 517, that tne plaintiff had alleged a substantial fourteenth
amendment due process claim, i_d. , that the state and federal
constitutional claims were based on the same core of operative
facts, ifiL , and that there were no special circumstances that
made the awarding of attorney fees unjust in light of the
policy of ordinarily awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs
under section 1983, ill. at 518. The court states: "if fee
awards were available only when a court had passed favorably on
a party's section 1983 claim, the Congressional policy of
encouraging private enforcement of civil rights would
contradict the judicial policy of avoiding decision on
constitutional claims.- 1x1. at 517.
As was the Lofft court, we are persuaded that plaintiff has
asserted a substantial due process claim which, because of our
narrow decision on state statutory grounds, we did not
address. We further find her state statutory and
constitutional claims arose out of a common nucleus of
operative fact. Finally, we conclude there is no special
circumstance which would mandate a denial of fees in this
case. We therefore remand for the determination of a
reasonable attorney fee.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KJudith M. Billings, Judg^

I CONCUR:

Pamela T.Greenwood,Judge

BENCH, Judge (Concurring and Dissenting):
I concur fully with the conclusion that the District's
policy is invalid under state law. I dissent, however, from the
decision to award plaintiff her attorney fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). I believe our original opinion,
reported at 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ct. App. 1989), correctly
disposed of this case. I therefore voted to deny rehearing, and
take this opportunity to explain why.
As pointed out by the majority, attorney fees are
recoverable in cases like this only when the winning state claim
is -pendent to a substantial constitutional claim." Maher v.
Gaane, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980). Unlike my colleagues, I do not
believe plaintiff's state claim is pendent to a substantial
claim under the federal constitution.
Plaintiff alleged in this case that the imposition of
student fees on those not receiving public assistance, but still
unable to pay, infringed on her children's right to a free
education. However, this is not a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the federal constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982) ("Public education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution.") (citing San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriques, 411 U.S. 1, 34
(1973)), reh'q denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). The only reference
in plaintiff's complaint to the federal constitution is in her
second cause of action and in paragraph 2 of her prayer for
relief. There, plaintiff alleged that her due process rights
were violated by defendants' delay in conducting an appeal
hearing on her request for fee waivers. I doubt that this
pleading constitutes a viable claim under section 1983.1 It
certainly is not a "substantial" claim under the federal
constitution, especially in view of the fact that plaintiff had
her appeal hearing four months after the District's decision
awarding her a partial waiver.2
1. Accord Call v. City of West Jordan, No. 880047, slip op. at
5-6 (Utah Ct. App. March 5, 1990). To treat such a claim as
viable will encourage the routine insertion of a generic,
procedural due process claim in every suit where state action is
alleged. Parties will thereby be able to circumvent the
principle that attorney fees are not recoverable absent an
explicit contractual or statutory provision. See Cobabe v.
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2. The main opinion's reliance on other possible due process
arguments is misplaced since plaintiff did not include such
allegations in her complaint.

Furthermore, to receive her fees under section 1988,
plaintiff's state claim must be "pendent" to a substantial
federal claim. Plaintiff prevailed in this c ~e because the
District's policy is more restrictive than tv Board's rules.
That is a question of law that suggests noth g about the
underlying procedure facts. As recently stated by the United
States Supreme Cour
Where the plaintiff's claims are based on
different facts and legal theories, and the
plaintiff has prevailed on only some of
those claims, . . . f,[t]he congressional
intent to limit [fee] awards to prevailing
parties requires that these unrelated claims
be treated as if they had been raised in
separate lawsuits, and therefore no fees may
be awarded for services on the unsuccessful
claim."
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland In p. School Dist., 109
S. Ct. 1486 (1989) (quoting Henslev v. E_ .erhart, 461 U.S. 424,
435 (1983)). See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015
(1984) .
Plaintiff % as failed to state a claim that will support an
award of attor .y fees under section 1988. In the absence of
another appliccole statute or agreement, plaintiff is not
entitled to her attorney fees.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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